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Abstract 
Purpose: This research is carried out to investigate the 
influence of firm characteristics and good governance 
characteristics to earnings management behavior. 
Furthermore, the research is expanded to determine the 
predictive discretionary accruals models in Indonesia. 
The author utilizing firm listed in Indonesia Stock 
Exchange during 2014 – 2018 as research object. 
Design/methodology/approach: The research samples 
is selected by utilizing the purposive sampling method. In 
addition, the data analyze is conducted through E-Views 
version 10. Three discretionary accruals models is used 
to define earnings management behavior. The research 
assumed firm characteristics factors such as financial 
performance, firm size, leverage, and share issuance 
activity and good governance characteristics such as 
board of directors’ size and auditor’s size. 
Findings: The research discovers that firm 
characteristics can accentuate the earnings management 
behavior significantly. In other hand, in good corporate 
governance characteristics only big four auditor is 
significant. The research also find that discretionary 
accruals model of Jones, Dechow, and Kothari are 
predictive in Indonesia. 
Practical implications:  The discoveries of this research 
provide understanding for investors that enforcement on 
both governance and monitoring mechanism are 
essential approach to reduce earnings management 
behavior. 
Originality/value:  The research investigated three 
models of discretionary accruals’ capability in predicting 
earnings management behavior, and found out all 
discretionary accruals model are still relevant to be use 
in predictive to define earnings management behavior in 
Indonesia.
DOI: 10.32602/jafas.2020.009 
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1. Introduction 
Firm valuation is yielded through the performance of firm in the short run and long run which 
is indicated by firm earnings. Therefore, firm earnings is closely associated with firm 
valuation. Release of concurrent information around earnings announcement show that 
there’s an increase in market response to earnings announcements  (Beaver, McNichols, & 
Wang, 2019). Consistent with the theory of fraud triangle, financial targets served as a 
rationalization to commit manipulation (Sukirman & Sari, 2013). Study also found out that 
managers’ ability would increase firm efficiency and decrease the possibility of earnings 
restatement, which will increase earnings quality eventually (Edi & Suyadi, 2018). Moreover, 
managers are found to perform aggressive accounting choice and risk taking behavior in 
financial reporting (Kim, 2015). Managers intentionally exploit the loopholes in financial 
regulations and accounting choice to obtain inappropriate benefits (Bhasin, 2016). Firm 
characteristics have strong impact on earnings management behavior. Some of them will 
accentuate the earnings management behavior, while others will attenuate it. Firm size, firm 
leverage, and firm financial performance are all found to have significant impact on earnings 
management (Charfeddine, Riahi, & Omri, 2013). Furthermore, effective good governance 
mechanism is also believed to constraint earnings management behavior (Salim & Hn, 2019). 
In early 2019, PT Garuda Indonesia is discovered to have earnings manipulation during the 
accounting period of 2018. The state owned company is found to manipulate earnings by 
recognizing unearned revenue of $239.94 million. The manipulation is deliberately conducted 
by managers disregard the opposition of the commissioners to make the performance looks 
better than the prior year. Earnings management is a phenomenon around the world. 
Recently in August 2019, US’s financial watchdog – the SEC conduct investigation towards 
General Electric. General Electric was suspected to commit bigger fraud than Enron, the 
accounting fraud it committed is worth for $38 billion which is over 40% of the firm’s market 
capitalization. Again, with the similar manner, the General Electric’s managers concealed an 
approximately $29 billion of losses from the public and is heading to bankruptcy. Accounting 
fraud is also involving start-up firms in Silicon Valley. In early 2019, WeWork, the unicorn 
start-up firm whose public offerings is the most expected event is burst out. WeWork suffered 
substantial losses over years. In 2016, it suffered $429 million of $436 million in revenue, and 
continually to suffer loss. In 2019, the firm reported loss of $690 million of $1.5 billion in 
revenue. Poor corporate governance is pointed as the reason behind the problems faced by 
We Work.  
The act of earnings management of course have caused the financial instrument cannot 
perform as guidelines in making decision (Walker, 2013). Therefore, the research is 
conducted to provide empirical evidence showing how to recognize earnings management, 
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which measurement is more appropriate to define earnings management behavior, under 
what circumstance it could be performed. Accordingly, earnings management behavior could 
be detected and prevented, and eventually financial and investment environment could be 
enforced. 
2. Literature Review and Hypothesis Development  
2.1 Theoretical Framework 
Factors as firm characteristics, good governance characteristics, and particular firm activity 
have been reported have significant impact on earnings management behavior (N. H. Dang, 
Hoang, & Tran, 2017). Consolidated financial statement, executive duality role, firm 
performance, firm size, and share issuance activity are found to have significant positive 
relationship with earnings management behavior. In other hand, auditor size as proxy of audit 
quality and financial leverage have significant negative relationship with earnings 
management behavior. Additionally, research suggested that cross sectional abnormal 
accruals model have capability to detect accruals based earnings management. Both standard 
discretionary accruals model and modified discretionary accruals model have been proved 
are more capable at identifying revenue and bad debt manipulation earnings management 
(Peasnell, Pope, & Young, 2000).  
Characteristics of earnings management in south-east Asia countries (Indonesia, Philippine, 
Singapore, Thailand, and Malaysia) is not similar (Wardani & Kusuma, 2012). By focusing on 
accruals based earnings management and real earnings management, the researchers found 
out that real earnings management is less aggressive in Indonesia and Philippine compared to 
the others countries. In contrast, accruals based earnings management is higher in Indonesia 
and Philippine compared to the others countries. Additionally, the study discovered that 
earnings management is opportunistic in Indonesia and Malaysia, but informational in 
Thailand and Philippines. Built on above theoretical framework, this research is conducted to 
investigate the influence of firm characteristics, good governance characteristics, and firm 
certain activity on earnings management behavior by utilizing cross sectional and time series 
discretionary accruals model to identify accrual based the earnings management behavior in 
Indonesia. 
2.2 Earning Management 
It has been a common knowledge for every financial statements reasonable users that stated 
figures in earnings probably be affected by accountant’s choices and discretions. Earnings 
management is an act of manipulating earnings. Manipulate is explained as the capability of 
management to add or reduce earnings at will (Copeland, 1968). Earnings management has 
been discovered as a phenomenon in financial reporting process whereas managers of a firm 
attempted to exhibit a fair earnings quality report to satisfy the high expectation of financial 
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statements users (Francis, Huang, Rajgopal, & Zang, 2008). By conducting earnings 
management, managers turned earnings as the report of their enthusiasm instead of as the 
result of firm financial performance (Levitt, 1998). The definition of earnings management 
have led us to think about the subjectivity in accounting process and how earnings 
management is committed. 
2.2.1 Accrual Based Earning Management 
Accruals based earnings management is interpreted as involvement of managers’ choices and 
discretions in preparing financial statements and constructing transaction, to provide 
misleading information regarding the financial condition of the firm (Healy & Wahlen, 1999). 
Accruals based earnings management might not essential to have impact on the cash flow 
(Cupertino, Martinez, & da Costa, 2015). Compared to real earnings management, accrual 
based earnings management is more prone to be discovered  and less costly (Kothari, Mizik, & 
Roychowdhury, 2016). Therefore, manager is predicted to commit accruals based earnings 
management prior to commit real earnings management. That is, a lot of researches 
(including this paper) are focused on accruals based earnings management to explain the 
activity of earnings management (Dechow, Sloan, & Sweeney, 1995; Healy, 1985; Jones, 1991; 
Kothari, Leone, & Wasley, 2005). 
2.2.2 Earning Management Measurement 
The research employed cash flow approach to acquire the value of total accruals which the 
equation is as follows: 
 
The equation above reflects the value of net operating accruals, which is the amount of short-
term accruals obtained from operating activities. Even so, the total value of accruals alone 
cannot be compared directly with other companies. This is because the value of accruals will 
be influenced by firm growth factor (DeAngelo, 1986). Therefore, total accruals must be 
scaled to the average of total assets to be comparable: 
 
Where: 
 : Total accruals of firm i on t period. 
 : Total assets of firm i at the end of t period. 
 : Net income of firm i on t period. 
 : Operating cash flow of firm i on t period. 
Accruals consist of discretionary accruals and non-discretionary accruals. Therefore, the value 
of discretionary accruals can be obtained by subtracting the value of non-discretionary 
accruals from total accruals. 
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Where: 
 : Discretionary accruals of firm i on t period. 
 : Non-discretionary accruals of firm i on t period. 
 The difference between the models of discretionary accruals that will be used reposed 
in the measurement approach of non-discretionary accruals. In this research, the 
discretionary accruals measurement model that will be used are as follows: 
1. Model of Jones (1991) 
 
Where: 
 : Change in revenue, which is calculated by  subtracting revenue of 
firm i on t period with revenue on t – 1 period. 
  : Value of  property, plant, and equipment of firm i at the end of t 
period. 
2. Model of Dechow et al. (1995) 
 
 
Where: 
 : Change in receivables, which is calculated by subtracting receivables 
of firm i on t period with receivables on t – 1 period. 
3. Model of Kothari et al. (2005) 
 
Where:  
 : Return on asset of firm i on period of t – 1. 
2.3 Firm Characteristics and Good Corporate Governance Characteristics 
Firm characteristics is described as organization internal factors that emerged within the 
internal environment of the organization itself and can be controlled which encompasses 
management influences and firm competencies (Zou & Stan, 1998). Furthermore, firm 
characteristics is categorized into seven classes: valuation, investment, prior returns, 
earnings, financial distress, external financing, and other class (Kogan & Tian, 2012). In this 
research, firm characteristics included are firm size to reflect valuation, firm performance to 
reflect earnings, leverage to reflect financial distress, and stock issuance activity to reflect 
external financing. 
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Mechanism of ownership and control to protect minority rights, legal inhibition against 
management self-benefit behavior is called corporate governance (Shleifer & Vishny, 1997). 
Therefore, good governance characteristics is reasoned as attentive oversight characteristics 
that reflected best practice to prohibit management discretion and restrict their ability to 
respond to the potentials of a financial crisis which is believed would bring detrimental effect 
towards a firm (Van Essen, Engelen, & Carney, 2013). The studies encompassed board of 
director’s size to reflect board characteristics and auditor’s size to reflect audit quality. 
2.3.1 Financial Perfomance 
Financial performance indicate the capability of a firm in utilizing assets to generate earnings. 
Return on assets provides an overview to see how much earnings after tax is obtained after 
investing in assets. Based on this definition, then in measuring the company's performance, 
the ratio of return on assets can be used (Alexander & Hengky, 2017; Dewi & Prasetiono, 
2012). 
2.3.2 Firm Size 
Firm size indicate the scale of a firm. Numerous of approaches are used to measure firm size, 
including total assets, market value of equity, and revenues. However, every approach of firm 
size only measure certain area of implication. The use of market capitalization is more 
suitable for market oriented and progressive implication, total assets is fit for the 
measurement of firm resources but not firm performance, and total revenue is an appropriate 
measurement for product market and non-progressive implication (C. Dang, (Frank) Li, & 
Yang, 2018). Earnings management engagement is associated with firm performance and is 
past oriented. Consistent with the argument, this research used the natural logarithm of total 
revenue approach to measure firm size (N. H. Dang et al., 2017). 
2.3.3  Leverage 
Leverage shows how a company utilizes debt to obtain economic benefits. In other words, 
leverage also can be used to measure the capital structure of a firm. Leverage can be obtained 
by comparing the level of a firm’s total debt to the total book value of the firm's assets (Azlina, 
2010; Mahawyahrti & Budiasih, 2017). 
2.3.4 Board of Director’s Size 
Board of directors is a group of people that are appointed to supervise, take charge of firm’s 
operational, and act in accordance to firm’s objective. An effective board of directors is an 
implication of good governance mechanism. Board characteristics can be measured in various 
ways. Board characteristics are identified through the composition of the board, such as: 
board of directors’ size, existence of independent directors, the dual role of Chief Executive 
Officer, and board tenure (Nugroho & Eko, 2011). Consistent with prior researches, this 
research use board of directors’ size by calculating the number of directors in the board as a 
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proxy of board characteristics (Neifar, Halioui, & Abdelaziz, 2016; Xie, Davidson, & DaDalt, 
2003). 
2.3.5 Auditor’s Size 
The size of firm’s independent auditor can be used as a benchmark for audit quality. 
Numerous of researchers argued that auditors that are associated with big four can provide 
higher audit quality compared to non-big four auditors (Hussainey, 2009; Rusmin, 2010). 
Based on this reason, numerous of researches measure the audit quality by categorizing 
auditor whether it is big four or non-big four auditors (Ahmad, Suhara, & Ilyas, 2016; Alves, 
2013). 
2.3.6 Share Issuance Activity 
Shares issuance is a way for firms to raise funds from external parties. Share issuance 
activities are believed to be a motivation for earnings management (Cohen & Zarowin, 2010; 
Yang, Hsu, & Yang, 2013). Therefore, the presence or absence of share issuance activities by 
firms in a period have an influence on earnings management behavior (N. H. Dang et al., 
2017). 
2.4 Firm Characteristics, Good Corporate Governance Characteristics and Earning 
Management Behavior. 
2.4.1 Financial Perfomance and Earning Management 
The possibility to engage earnings management become higher when executives’ 
compensation are based on firm financial performance (Sun, 2014).  
Managers have a tendency to engage earnings management to satisfy financial thresholds in 
three conditions:  
1. To avoid negative earnings in current performance (Charoenwong & Jiraporn, 2009).  
2. To sustain firm financial performance (Amar & Abaoub, 2010). 
3. To fulfil analyst’s prognosis (Doyle, Jennings, & Soliman, 2013).  
By comparing firm that missing analyst’s prognosis and firm that meeting analyst’s prognosis, 
the research suggested firm that meeting analyst’s prognosis by manage accruals expense 
downwardly will gain short run share price benefit (Bhojraj, Hribar, Picconi, & McInnis, 2009). 
That is, by mean of earnings management behavior, reported financial performance is 
expected to be higher. Build upon the exposition above, therefore the first hypotheses in this 
research is 
H1: Financial performance has positive and significant influence on earnings management.  
2.4.2 Firm Size and Earning Management 
Insistence to have a better financial performance, larger possession of assets, and negotiation 
power to bargain with auditors provided large firms opportunity and motivation to engage 
more earnings management (Ali, Noor, Khurshid, & Mahmood, 2015). According to the 
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political cost assumption, large firms might have higher political cost and under more public 
attention, therefore large firms will engage more earnings management behavior (Rusmin, 
Scully, & Tower, 2013). Auditors will probably impede earnings management behavior 
engaged by small firm than large firm. Audit partners in non-big four are found to 
compromise audit independence for financially significant clients (W. Chi, Douthett, & Lisic, 
2012).  The predictability of earnings is found lower is large firm due to the higher probability 
of earnings manipulation to elude negative earnings and government intervention (Ahmed 
AL-Dhamari & Nor Izah Ku Ismail, 2014). Moreover as firm size increase, family firms will 
more possible to engage in earnings management behavior (Martin, Campbell, & Gomez-Mejia, 
2016). Large firms have more complicated and complex transaction compared to small firm, 
thus large firm is more prompt to engage earnings management (N. H. Dang et al., 2017). The 
higher information and agency risk faced by large firm are believed to enable managers to 
conduct earnings management (Nalarreason, T, & Mardiati, 2019). Other study revealed that 
large firm prompt to utilize discretionary accruals in placing their seasonal share issuance 
(Shu & Chiang, 2014). Based on explanation above, therefore the second hypotheses in this 
research is 
H2: Firm size has positive and significant influence on earnings management. 
2.4.3 Leverage and Earning Management 
Creditors and investors are argued to monitor firms that they funded in. Study found out that 
short term liability is positively associated with earnings management behavior only strong 
for low creditworthiness firms (Fung & Goodwin, 2013). Firms’ earnings management 
behavior is found decreasing when bank monitoring mechanism’s efficiency increased (Ahn & 
Choi, 2009). The level of leverage is found low in pre-merger and acquisition firms which 
engage in upward earnings management behavior (Alsharairi & Salama, 2012). Additionally, 
another study also find that distressed firms are actually less possible to commit earnings 
management because those firms will used up all means for engaging earnings management 
(Ghazali, Shafie, & Sanusi, 2015). When level of debt comparatively low, the regression of debt 
on earnings management is found negative. In contrast, when debt is high, the regression is 
found positive (Alzoubi, 2018). Debt is found to incline positive earnings management in low 
transparency and high diversified firms (Rodríguez-Pérez & van Hemmen, 2010). Intensified 
leverage limiting manager’s opportunistic behavior due to strict monitoring therefore 
alleviate accrual-based earnings management however exacerbate real earnings management 
(Vakilifard & Mortazavi, 2016). According to the elucidation above, therefore the third 
hypotheses in this research is 
H3: Leverage has negative and significant influence on earnings management. 
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2.4.4 Board of Director’ Size and Earning Management 
Directors are in charge of firm’s daily operation and therefore possessed more information of 
firm compared to owners which increase information risk. Executives will behave in their 
own interest, thus have incentive to conduct earnings management. Investigation towards the 
relationship between corporate governance and earnings management, provide evidence that 
larger board size are associated with more earnings management behavior (Swastika, 2013). 
Empirical evidence revealed that large board size vision a failure of board advisory and 
monitoring role, and caused an negative influence on firm performance (Guest, 2009). A 
positive relationship between board size and earnings management appear as board’s 
members increases up to seven members (Geraldes Alves, 2011). By categorizing board size, 
research found out that board size of nine to twelve members are involved with higher 
earnings management behavior (Epps & Ismail, 2009). These findings suggest that smaller 
board does provide more effective monitoring role compared to large board. An unduly large 
board will cause monitoring mechanism become ineffective (Veronica Siregar & Bachtiar, 
2010). Other research emphasized that compared to other elements, quality of board is the 
most essential elements in governance mechanism (Payal & Singh, 2017). In accordance to the 
explication above, therefore the fourth hypotheses in this research is 
H4: Board of directors’ size has positive and significant influence on earnings 
management. 
2.4.4 Auditor’s Size and Earning Management 
Auditor’s size is one of audit quality’s attribute. Earnings predictability are found higher when 
firms are audited by big four auditors compare to non-big four auditors (Hussainey, 2009). 
Big four auditors are argued to compete with each other on audit value – price and quality by 
subsidizing in audit technology along with the market size (Sirois & Simunic, 2011). In 
addition, big auditors are more likely to preserve their independence compare to small 
auditors (W. Chi et al., 2012). In summary, big four auditors are revealed to reduce earnings 
management behavior effectively compared to non-big four auditors for several reasons 
(Rusmin, 2010): 
1. Big four auditors have higher motivation to preserve their reputation in 
international level, thus will improve their audit quality. 
2. Big four auditors have higher independence compared to non-big four auditors. 
3. Big four auditors have more qualified resource in technology, human, and capital 
that enable them to provide high audit quality. 
Enforcement on legal system and legal environment can directly affect audit environment. Big 
four auditors will be capable to alleviate earnings management behavior under sufficient 
negligence mechanism (Yasar, 2013). Big four auditors constraint earnings management 
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behavior in effective legal system audit environment (Memiş & Çetenak, 2012). Posit on the 
description above, therefore the fifth hypotheses in this research is 
H5: Auditor’s size has negative and significant influence on earnings management. 
2.4.5 Share Issuance Activity and Earning Management 
Earnings management is engaged in order to meet financial threshold and analysts’ forecast 
so that firm’s share price will soar up in the short run (Bhojraj et al., 2009). Income increasing 
earnings management resulted in equity overvaluation (J. (Daniel) Chi & Gupta, 2009). 
Research discovered that firms which issue multiple seasoned equity offerings will 
continuously manage discretionary accruals to raise earnings (Chang & Lin, 2018). Moreover, 
firms are found to engage in both real and accrual-based earnings management during 
seasoned equity offerings (Cohen & Zarowin, 2010). By analyzing long run performance, the 
study revealed that firms that managed earnings aggressively during initial public offerings 
suffered poor share returns after several periods (Yang et al., 2013). Furthermore, 
researchers documented three movements of discretionary accruals during share issuance 
(Miloud, 2014): 
1. Grow before share issuance period 
2. Reach the peak on the share issuance period, and 
3. Decline after share issuance period. 
Earnings management around seasoned equity offerings engaged by large firm is positively 
associated with short term performance and negatively associated with long term 
performance (Shu & Chiang, 2014). Postulate on the findings above, therefore the last 
hypotheses in this research is 
H6: Share issuance activity has positive and significant influence on earnings management. 
3. Research Methodology 
The research employed firms listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange (IDX) during 2014 - 
2018 as research objects. The research samples are obtained through purposive sampling 
method, a non-random techniques that are based on distinctive quality of the samples (Etikan, 
Musa, & Alkassim, 2016). Furthermore, the audited financial statements is obtained from the 
sample firm official websites and IDX website. The multiple linear regression, the panel 
regression, the Spearman, data analyze was employed through is the E-Views program 
version 10.  
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4. Research Finding 
Table 4.1 Result of Hypotheses Test (FEM) – Jones Model 
Predictor Variables 
Attributed Variable – Jones Discretionary Accruals 
Model 
Coefficient 
t-Statistics 
Prob. 
Conclusion 
Financial Performance 0.271896 0.0000 Significant Positive 
Firm Size -0.014009 0.0001 Significant Negative 
Leverage -0.000731 0.8273 
Insignificant 
Negative 
Board of Directors’ Size 0.003826 0.1359 Insignificant Positive 
Share Issuance Activity 0.018559 0.0030 Significant Positive 
Auditor’s Size -0.013734 0.1980 
Insignificant 
Negative 
Source: Authors' calculations (2019) 
 
Table 4.2 Result of Hypotheses Test (REM) – Dechow Model 
Predictor Variables 
Attributed Variable – Dechow Discretionary 
Accruals Model 
Coefficient 
t-Statistics 
Prob. 
Conclusion 
Financial Performance 0.301680 0.0000 Significant Positive 
Firm Size 0.005372 0.0006 Significant Positive 
Leverage -0.014523 0.0000 Significant Negative 
Board of Directors’ Size -4.78E-05 0.9725 
Insignificant 
Negative 
Share Issuance Activity 0.018964 0.0008 Significant Positive 
Auditor’s Size -0.010663 0.0486 Significant Negative 
Source: Authors' calculations (2019) 
 
Table 4.3 Result of Hypotheses Test (REM) – Kothari Model 
Predictor Variables 
Attributed Variable – Kothari Discretionary 
Accruals Model 
Coefficient 
t-Statistics 
Prob. 
Conclusion 
Financial Performance 0.282479 0.0000 Significant Positive 
Firm Size 0.005225 0.0010 Significant Positive 
Leverage -0.003991 0.0939 
Insignificant 
Negative 
Board of Directors’ Size -5.55E-05 0.9685 
Insignificant 
Negative 
Share Issuance Activity 0.019813 0.0006 Significant Positive 
Auditor’s Size -0.012365 0.0239 Significant Negative 
Source: Authors' calculations (2019) 
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The research discovered that financial performance, firm size, and share issuance activity can 
accentuate the earnings management behavior significantly on firms listed in Indonesia Stock 
Exchange (IDX). In other hand, big four auditors can attenuate the earnings management 
behavior significantly. Leverage can decrease earnings management behavior however is 
partially significant. Board of directors’ size have negative influence on earnings management 
behavior, however the influence is insignificant. Moreover, the result show that the 
hypotheses test of Jones’ model is different from Dechow and Kothari’s model. Therefore, the 
Spearman’s Rank correlation analyze is carried out to investigate the predictive capability of 
Jones’ model. 
Table 4.4 The Spearman’s Rank Correlation Analyze 
Cases JONES  DECHOW  KOTHARI  
JONES  1.000000   
Probability -----   
DECHOW  0.927880 1.000000  
Probability 0.0000 -----  
KOTHARI  0.926605 0.990788 1.000000 
Probability 0.0000 0.0000 ----- 
                Source: Authors' calculations (2019) 
 
The Spearman’s Rank correlation test show that all discretionary accruals are strongly 
correlated. The correlation between Dechow model and Kothari model is higher compared to 
the correlation towards Jones model. In the discretionary accruals of Jones model, it was 
assumed that revenue cannot be influenced by managers’ discretion or is non-discretionary 
(Dechow et al., 1995). However, earnings management could have been managed through 
revenue. Managers use strategic revenue recognition by utilizing both deferral sales account 
and accrual sales account to avert earnings uncertainty (Caylor, 2010). Therefore, although all 
discretionary accruals are strongly correlated, the hypotheses result of Jones model is 
different from the other models. But the jones model, dechow and Kothari are still relevant as 
a measurement for earning management. 
5. Conclusion 
Managers might engage earnings management to obtain short run stock benefit (Bhojraj et al., 
2009). Larger firms possesses more incentives and opportunities to conduct earnings 
management (Ali et al., 2015; N. H. Dang et al., 2017). This phenomenon signify that 
governance practice and earnings quality in large firm might not better than small firms. In 
other hand, big four auditors can attenuate the earnings management behavior significantly. 
This suggest Indonesia have an efficient audit environment that enable the big four auditors to 
perform effectively. As studies suggested big four auditors might limit earnings management 
behavior under enforced legal environment (Memiş & Çetenak, 2012; Yasar, 2013). Leverage 
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can decrease earnings management behavior however is partially significant. This indicate 
that creditors such as bank could serve as external monitor mechanism on firms, however 
needs more enforcement from the internal monitor mechanism from firm itself. Board of 
directors’ size have negative influence on earnings management behavior, however the 
influence is insignificant.  
Due to the different hypotheses result among Jones’ model and the other two models, the 
Spearman’s Rank correlation is carried out. The findings in the research show that all 
discretionary accruals model are predictive in Indonesia. However, correlation between 
Dechow and Kothari’s model are slightly higher than Jones’ model.  
The findings suggest that enforcement on legal system should not only be applied on audit 
environment but also firm corporate governance policy. Moreover, as bank efficiency 
increased, debt firms’ earnings management behavior could be decreased (Ahn & Choi, 2009). 
That is, monitor and control mechanism to protect investor should be relied on both internal 
mechanism (through corporate governance) and external mechanism (through independent 
auditors and banks). For investors and creditors, discoveries of this research provide novel 
understanding that firm valuation should not only based on financial figures such as firm 
performance and firm size. Qualitative measure such as managerial ability and corporate 
governance practice and characteristics should also be emphasized (Edi & Suyadi, 2018; Salim 
& Hn, 2019). Further research might concentrated on variables that constraint earnings 
management behavior such as leverage and board structures. The extend of leverage in 
distressed firm that would attenuate earnings management behavior could be focused on 
(Alzoubi, 2018). In addition, further research could also focused on the quality of boards 
rather than only focused on boards’ size (Payal & Singh, 2017). 
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